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The aim of this article is to provide a philosophical analysis of some prominent 
issues concerning voluntary death. The first part examines meanings of voluntary 
death in recent Anglo-American philosophy, with an emphasis on Michael Cholbi’s 
assessments, the aim being to find a suitable working definition for suicide. The 
second part surveys the most common arguments for the moral permissibility of 
suicide and offers a model for rational suicide. The last part deals with challenges 
these arguments and conditions may encounter in the light of some recent 
naturalistically inclined views of human nature.
This article provides a philosophical analysis of some elementary aspects of 
voluntary death, concentrating specifically on the definition and moral permissibility 
of suicide as they are presented and debated by contemporary Anglo-American 
philosophers.1 In addition, it will consider whether some of the recent currents in 
scientific understanding of human nature affect how we are to approach the issue 
of voluntary death. I call these science-leaning views naturalistic, which in this 
context refers primarily to methodological naturalism, understood as a proposition 
that while explaining natural phenomena, including human beings, scientists should 
not appeal to supernatural entities. Secondarily, it refers to metaphysical/ontological 
naturalism, understood as a proposition that supernatural entities do not exist, and 
furthermore to a view that we should pay attention to changing scientific knowledge 
and at least consider the possible effects of this knowledge to our understanding of 
ourselves and moral practices we are involved in.2
1 I pay specific attention to the texts of Michael Cholbi, who has written the entry on suicide in 
the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. His recent book, Suicide. The Philosophical Dimensions, 
offers a good overview of recent Anglo-American discussion on the philosophy of suicide, and is a 
significant contribution to the definition and moral status of suicide. (Cholbi 2011, 2012.)
2 For definitions on methodological and metaphysical naturalism, see Draper 2009. At the popular 
level some recent attempts to deal with the moral and existential issues that have to do with the 
changing picture of human nature are: Metzinger 2009; Flanagan 2007; 2011; Rosenberg 2011; 
Carrier 2005; Harris 2012. 
Hanna Ronikonmäki
139
Why is voluntary death a relevant issue to pay attention to in the first place? One 
obvious reason is the status of suicide in our society, both in the legislative realm 
and in the more personal sphere of people. There are, for instance, ongoing debates 
about the legality of physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia in several Western 
countries.3 Another motivation for these considerations lies in the accumulation of 
scientific research on human nature, as mentioned above, which has the potential 
to dramatically change our understanding of ourselves. It seems reasonable to ask 
whether and in what ways some of these new findings could question our deeply-
held beliefs about human agency, autonomy, and freedom, which are behind 
many of the liberal political ideologies at work in Western societies, including our 
legislation and moral arguments on the permissibility of suicide. My interest in 
reflecting on these perspectives is due to the visibility these kinds of naturalistic 
views have gained in popular culture during the past decade; it seems warranted to 
ponder what consequences changing worldviews could have with regard to some 
of our moral practices, such as our attitude towards voluntary death.4 Despite 
many of these views being criticized by academic and religious thinkers, they have 
nevertheless gained some positive attention especially in the Western cultures, 
which can be seen in, for instance, the growing popularity of religious naturalism 
and atheist spirituality.5
The structure of the article is as follows: First, I describe some recent 
conceptions of suicide and try to form the best working definition for my own use. I 
do not aim at developing or finding universal truths with regard to suicide but take 
it that suicide is a fluid, synthetic (instead of analytic) concept, yet I try to establish 
some kind of suggestive definition from where to advance into thinking about the 
moral questions that have to do with voluntary death. In order to make sense of 
the debate on the permissibility of voluntary death, we need to understand what 
we are talking about in the first place, even if we do not see there being a single 
universal meaning for the term. I then present the most popular contemporary 
arguments for the moral permissibility of suicide and pay special attention to so-
called rational suicide that to me seems most plausible and coherently justified. 
Lastly, I deal with naturalistically influenced criticism on rational suicide. My main 
questions, in short, are: what does suicide amount to as a philosophical concept, 
3 In Finland, for instance, suicide is not illegal and it is not mentioned in our criminal law. Nor is 
assisted suicide mentioned, which is more peculiar and may be debated in future if the euthanasia 
discussion receives more political attention. In the Finnish political sphere, the first positive comment 
for euthanasia on moral grounds was made by the Greens, although there was still no mention of the 
practical side of the issue. See <www.vihreat.fi/files/liitto/Periaateohjelma2012.pdf>, page 5. (visited 
6 August 2013)
4 Considering the possible consequences of certain views on human nature does not require 
taking these views as true; the question is about the inner coherence of the moral practices and 
worldviews or real people.
5 For the types of atheist spirituality, see Sillfors & Ronikonmäki 2013.
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and in what circumstances, if any, can suicide be taken as morally permissible 
taking into consideration the naturalistic predicament?6
Definition of Suicide
I will use Michael Cholbi’s definition of suicide as a working tool in assessing the 
complexities of the concept of voluntary death. Cholbi presents an intention-based 
description of suicide in which he states that “[s]uicide is intentional self-killing: 
a person’s act is suicidal if and only if the person believed that the act, or some 
causal consequence of that act, would make her death likely and she engaged in 
the behaviour to intentionally bring about her death.”7 For this definition to be apt, 
it is necessary to analyze what the different parts of the definition amount to. How 
does suicidal behavior differ from suicide? What is meant by intentional? What 
is covered in self-killing and what is not? And finally, how likely must death be 
anticipated in order for the behavior in question to be suicidal?
The first issue needing clarification within the idea that suicide is self-killing 
comes from the fact that not all suicidal acts result in death. In other words, we have 
a vast array of suicidal attempts and behaviors that leave the subject alive. Hence, 
Cholbi takes suicide to refer only to an end result of a suicidal act(s) and pays more 
attention to the suicidal behavior. Suicide requires an element of intentionality, and 
suicidal behavior is thus an act/collection of acts in which a person intentionally kills 
or tries to kill him/herself.8 The difference between suicide and suicidal behavior 
can be compared to the concepts of death and dying respectively. A person can 
be in the process of dying but may recover without having actually died. Still, the 
process of dying is called dying, because the end result could have been death, 
considering all the necessary criteria of a human being approaching the state of 
death.9
Another challenge to Cholbi’s definition comes from the understanding of 
intentionality. One of the problems here arises from the “doctrine of double effect,” 
which acknowledges that sometimes our intention to do something has other effects 
that are foreseen but not intended, and these foreseen effects that would be morally 
6 It should be noted that I do not deal with the question of whether suicide, assisted suicide or 
euthanasia should or should not be criminalized by the state. Instead, I try to assess some of the 
more conceptual problems within the discourse on suicide. This means that even if suicide turned 
out to be morally impermissible (either universally or in some cases), it should not be assumed that 
suicide needs to be criminalized, as there may be other reasons for maintaining the present state of 
affairs.
7 Cholbi 2011, 21. 
8 Ibid.
9 These criteria can include certain medically assessed mental and physical symptoms, such 
as mental disorientation, excessive sleeping, lowered blood pressure and body temperature, or 
changes in breath and skin color. Recovering from the process of dying is of course more common 
in a situation of emergency, such as a car accident, where the symptoms of dying are more acute 
(collapse of blood pressure, unconsciousness, etc.). See Nuland 1995.
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unjustified as intentions can be permissible as “double effects.”10 We can apply the 
doctrine to the concept of suicide, but without the moral evaluation. Cholbi takes an 
example of a soldier who jumps on a grenade to save his comrades. It is important 
to note that the soldier does not jump in order to die, even if that is foreseen by 
him, but in order to save other people. Death is not his intention, even if he knows, 
for a very short period of time, that he will die.11 In effect, as Cholbi himself notes, 
suicide is very rarely motivated by an intention to die as such, but death is chosen 
as an instrument to acquire some other end, which may be relief from suffering, 
loyalty to authorities such as one’s country or God, or saving others’ lives. Cholbi 
therefore rejects a definition of suicide as intentional self-killing where death is the 
ultimate intention. Instead, he proposes intentionality to have a broader meaning 
in the definition of suicide, so that it covers a person’s rational endorsement of 
death, not necessarily one’s specific intention to die. So, for Cholbi, “[a] person’s 
self-killing is intentional just in case her death has her rational endorsement in the 
circumstances in which she acts so as to bring about her death.”12 
There are some ambiguities, though, as to the “knowledge during a very short 
period of time,” for some acts require immediate, non-deliberate action that can 
hardly be counted as containing rational knowledge. One option to solve this is to 
change the definition to include a conditional intentionality, meaning that for suicidal 
people death as a probable outcome of their action has their rational endorsement 
or would have had, given time to think.13 However, this does not solve the problem 
in the case of those who are already dead, for how can we know for sure that they 
really foresaw death or would have seen it given the time? It seems, therefore, 
that the only way to imply suicidal as an attribute of an act is by the approval of 
the suicidal people themselves to use that term or by their statement that they 
did foresee death as a likely end result before taking action. This decision would 
therefore leave some deaths, the soldier and grenade included, as ambiguous with 
regard to suicidal intent.
The strength of taking rational endorsement, or foreknowledge as William E. 
Tolhurst calls it, as the necessary, if not sufficient, condition for intentionality is that 
it also covers actual intentions to die.14 What needs to be remembered, however, is 
that even if both the intended and foreseen outcomes are covered in the definition, 
this is not to say that the distinction between intention and foreseeing is morally 
irrelevant. From the moral point of view we can formulate a hierarchy of intentions 
10 The doctrine of double effect dates back to Thomas Aquinas. One common example is killing in 
self-defense. See McIntyre 2011.
11 Cholbi 2011, 27.
12 Ibid., 28. This is reminiscent of Emile Durkheim’s classic definition of suicide, which is: “suicide 
is applied to all cases of death resulting directly or indirectly from a positive or negative act of the 
victim himself, which he knows will produce this result.” (Durkheim 1951, 44. See also McMahan 
2002, 456.)
13 This addition was first presented to me by Dan-Johan Eklund.
14 Tolhurst 1990, 79.
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that influence the moral evaluation of the matter; for instance, the intention to die 
is taken as worse than only foreseeing death during an act. In real-life cases, 
however, it is questionable whether we can make sense of what the actual intention 
of the person committing suicide was, and what was just a side effect of the act. 
It is also worth inquiring whether the actual intentions are ever clear even to the 
agents of the action. As abundant psychological research has shown, most people 
who have behaved in a suicidal way were ambivalent about their own intentions 
towards dying.15 The prevailing problem is also that suicide is often seen as having 
negative moral value and thus in many cases, which Cholbi’s definition would 
consider suicidal, such action is not seen in this light.16 
Another problem in Cholbi’s definition has to do with the concept of self-killing, 
for it seems that in some situations a person can intend to die but the actual killing is 
performed by someone else. This is the case with, for instance, active euthanasia 
or a “suicide by cop.”17 Cholbi’s assessment of this is that self-killing should not 
refer narrowly to the performer of the act, and thus exclude every external factor, 
be it another agent or a circumstance. Instead, a behavior can be called suicidal 
regardless of the causal initiation of the death or risk of it (a brave soldier did not 
cause the grenade to land in his foxhole) or the means of killing (a euthanized 
patient is killing himself even if the doctor injects the drug).18 The emphasis is on 
the person’s rational endorsement of his or her actions and the willingness and 
commitment to act in that way, not the actual mechanism or performance of the 
action. Suicidal action can also be either passive or active in nature, which becomes 
clear in the distinctions between active and passive suicide. Steven Luper depicts 
suicide as active in a case where a person takes action A, which he expects will 
induce death, and does A for that reason. Passive suicide is the omission of action 
B, such as having an operation, the result of which is that death happens sooner 
than it would have happened if action B had been taken, and this omission of an 
action is chosen particularly in order to hasten death.19 The same criterion applies 
to a person who dies in consequence of a self-chosen hunger strike. Because in 
these cases the person’s intention, taken in the broader meaning of the term, was 
death, they can in Cholbi’s view be claimed to be suicides.20
15 Cholbi 2011, 31–35. For the commonalities of psychological characters of suicidal people 
including the ambivalence of their action, see Shneidman 1996, 129–136.
16 For instance, the deaths of Socrates or Jesus would be suicides in Cholbi’s system in the same 
way as Hitler’s death was, but people often feel that they cannot be put in the same category 
because of the moral worth of Socrates and Jesus (Cholbi 2012, chapter 1). For altruistic suicides, 
see also Tolhurst 1990. This argument is relevant only if one sees intuititions of people or general 
opinion as a premise for justification.
17 Suicide by cop refers to a situation where an individual makes the police kill him to protect other 
citizens, as in a hostage drama. Cholbi 2011, 21.
18 Cholbi 2011, 21–22.
19 Luper 2009, 175.
20 Terence M. O’Keeffe (1990) offers an analysis of self-starvation and suicide.
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Some philosophers add the condition “to not be coerced into suicidal behaviour” 
to the definition of suicide. It is not clear, however, what is meant by coercion. Is it 
always human-induced or can circumstances also be coercive? In Cholbi’s opinion, 
self-killing can be coerced by someone or something, and the act can still be 
intentional and thus fit the definition of suicide. This is the case with, for instance, a 
dissident who is made to choose between a self-taken poison and a shooting by a 
firing squad, and who then decides to take the poison. What would not be a suicide, 
however, is a case where someone would be hypnotized and made to act so as to 
induce his or her own death. In Cholbi’s assessment, that situation would be non-
rational and count as a murder committed by the hypnotizer.21
The final issue in Cholbi’s definition has to do with the likelihood of death in 
one’s anticipation of certain behavior and its consequences. As already mentioned, 
at least two conditions are often required for a behavior to be suicidal: 1) a person 
must believe in the deathly nature of the behavior in question, and 2) a person 
must choose to engage in that behavior.22 These conditions, however, can be 
problematic. For instance, people can and often do have false beliefs in killing 
methods and their lethality. Cholbi replies to this by saying that a condition 1) does 
not require knowing, just believing.23 This creates an interesting outcome with 
regard to the differences in people’s personal beliefs about the likelihood of death 
from a certain action. If a subjective evaluation (=belief) creates the condition for 
an action to be suicidal, it means, for instance, that one person parachuting can 
be regarded as suicidal, because she or he willingly takes part in an activity she 
or he believes can be fatal; on the other hand, another parachutist is not suicidal, 
because she or he does not consider there to be any risk of death in the activity. 
Thus, the same kind of behavior can be either suicidal or not, based solely on the 
beliefs of the subjects of the action. Another consideration is how high in objective 
terms the risk of death has to be in order for an action to be suicidal. If I know that 
eating self-cooked blowfish has, let’s say, a 0.5 risk of fatal poisoning, and I decide 
to eat it, am I suicidal? 
The most straightforward solution for avoiding the unwanted outcome of 
naming all risk-taking activities as suicidal would be to consider only those actions 
as suicidal in which the person takes an action specifically in order to die, whether 
or not, on closer inspection, the intention to die is only a means to something else. 
Thus, the conscious, primary intention of a suicidal person is to act in a certain 
way in order to die.24 Consequently, such cases as a soldier jumping on a grenade 
21 Cholbi 2011, 36–37. Tolhurst (1990, 84) comes to the same conclusion that in some cases there 
can be coercion involved yet the act is still a suicide.
22 So the behavior of X is suicidal, if a) X believed that B or some of B’s consequences would 
make her dying likely (doxastic condition) and b) X engaged in B as an intention to die. Cholbi 2012, 
chapter 1.
23 Cholbi 2012, chapter 1.
24 O’Keeffe distinguishes in the same manner between instrumental and non-instrumental self-
killings, where only the latter are suicides (see O’Keeffe 1990, 127).
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would become either non-suicidal or ambiguous (we would still need to know 
his intentions); some cases would not be suicides even if there was a rational 
endorsement of a certain risk of death (death during extreme sports if the person 
has not acclaimed his or her wish to die while doing them), and some previously 
ambiguous cases would be suicides (voluntary euthanasia). 
Glenn C. Graber makes a similar distinction between intentional death and death 
as a foreseen outcome of an action done with an intention other than death, and 
he includes only the former cases as suicides. The primary intention of the action 
must be death in order for that action to be claimed suicidal. In Graber’s view, the 
soldier jumping on a grenade, for instance, is not committing suicide, because the 
primary intention is to save others and death is only an unfortunate side effect.25 
However, as mentioned above, we ought to know the actual mental processing of 
the person doing the act if we are to discover his intentions. There is a possibility 
that the soldier jumping on a grenade, for instance, has been thinking about killing 
himself, and when the grenade comes he sees his opportunity and jumps on the 
grenade primarily in order to die, not to save others.
Another solution to overcoming the analytical difficulties of the term suicide 
is to see suicidal behavior as a continuum, where different kinds of acts can be 
situated according to the degrees of different elements in the concept; these 
include intentionality, coercion, or the performing agent. The suicidal nature of 
some incidents would be clearer, closer to an ideal of suicide so to speak, whereas 
some would fall into a grayer area.26 Still another option, related to the former idea, 
is to accept that suicide is not a universal or analytically definable concept as such 
but is more like a set of incidents that have a Wittgensteinian family resemblance to 
each other.27 This means that suicidal phenomenon A (euthanasia) can resemble 
suicidal phenomenon B (refusal of medical treatment), but is further from suicidal 
phenomenon F (altruistic self-killing); yet all of them are suicides. This makes 
sense especially if one pays attention to different kinds of phenomena connected to 
voluntary death. Conceptual openness is also supported by the history of suicide, 
for it is not always clear what kind of self-caused death or harmful behavior is 
deemed suicidal.28 
In conclusion, Cholbi’s endeavor to find a definition for suicide is understandable 
as the work of an analytical philosopher, for his point is to find neutral enough 
ground on which to base a moral discussion. The idea of suicide as intentional 
self-killing offers that kind of a description, even if it cannot escape the age-old 
moral and emotional burden that the term suicide carries. This, however, is more 
of a problem for the users of language than for the philosophical work. As Cholbi 
25 Graber 1990, 139.
26 This grey area covers those cases in which our “pretheoretical dispositions” do not clearly 
resolve whether the term suicide is appropriate. See Tolhurst 1990, 78.
27 Cholbi 2012, chapter 1.
28 For the history of suicide in Western cultures, see Minois 1999 and van Hooff 1990.
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himself acknowledges, his definition cannot cover all real-life cases, but what he 
tries to do is shed light on the present-day complexities involved in specifying 
certain behaviors and phenomena as suicidal acts, so that most incidents could 
initially be categorized as either a “suicide” or “not suicide.”29 In the moral and legal 
spheres, however, which follow the definition phase, he calls for more divergent 
terms to capture the moral nature of various kinds of suicides. This is already 
evident in the different categories of killing another person: manslaughter, killing, 
and murder.30
Arguments for the Moral Permissibility of Suicide
In most human cultures, suicide, like any killing, has been seen as a moral issue 
of some kind. In the Western hemisphere, libertarianism with its emphasis on the 
rights of autonomous individuals has made an impact on our jurisdictions, and 
is behind many of the most influential present-day views on the moral status of 
suicide.31 There are different degrees of libertarian attitudes towards suicide: some 
claims emphasize duties, while some emphasize rights concerning suicide. The 
general background principle is the claim to the right of suicide.32 Cholbi presents 
several possible reasons for morally justifying this claim. First, it can be stated that 
everyone has the right to commit suicide, because they own the object that they 
are about to abolish. Second, moral permissibility for suicide can be defended 
because killing oneself under certain conditions is seen as a mode of self-defense. 
The third option is to refer to self-knowledge; the person himself knows best what 
is in his interest and what the conditions for his well-being are. Finally, the right 
29 Cholbi 2011, 37.
30 Cholbi 2011, 34.
31 Since libertarianism is a remarkably convoluted concept and is used in ambiguous ways, 
I cannot delve into all its distinctions here. A very general libertarian viewpoint is based on the 
idea that agents own themselves fully and can acquire property rights of external things since they 
have certain moral powers (Vallentyne 2010). What I am referring to in this context is restricted to 
libertarian principles with regard to voluntary death. This is because libertarian ideas on individual 
rights and liberties have influenced our present-day legislation on suicide, which in most Western 
countries was changed during the latter part of the 20th century. There are undoubtedly many reasons 
behind the changes in suicide legislation, such as the decreasing influence of traditional religions 
or developments in psychological and psychiatric research, but the stress on personal liberties is 
certainly among the greatest influences on these changes (Cholbi 2011, 71). Interestingly, and in 
contrast to developments within psychiatry, the background for the present day libertarian view on 
suicide is, as Cholbi states, often based on the “anti-psychiatry” movement, which sees actions to 
prohibit suicide as attempts to pathologize individuals and their moral freedom. (See Cholbi 2012, 
chapter 3.4; See also Szasz 2002; 2011.)
32 Another more general type of claim is the right to liberty. Its basic statement is that individuals 
have no duty to not commit suicide. A slightly stronger claim is the right of noninterference, which 
argues that it is morally forbidden for others to interfere with one’s suicidal behavior. This claim is 
still largely debated, especially with regard to forced psychiatric care. The strongest of the libertarian 
claims is the claim right, which argues that others are not only morally forbidden to interfere but are 
morally required to assist a person who wants to commit suicide. See Cholbi 2012, chapter 3.4.
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to suicide in a more general sense can be grounded on individual, sometimes 
rational, autonomy.33 
The argument that draws on self-defense is based on a common presumption 
that killing another person is not morally impermissible if it is done in order to 
protect oneself from acute and serious bodily harm. Like Cholbi, I am not going 
to assess whether killing in self-defense really is morally permissible, but I will 
assume that at least in some cases it is, and assess whether arguments for it can 
be applied to self-killing, too. In essence, I am asking whether suicide can be seen 
as killing in self-defense.
The first puzzle, according to Cholbi, is how killing oneself can be seen as 
defending oneself, when the outcome is the annihilation of that very self. What 
kind of a threat could be bigger than death? A common route of argumentation is 
to take the example of a person who is suffering from a fatal and painful medical 
condition, and who considers that continuing life has less value than ending it. 
Is there a problem in seeing this as a suicide committed in self-defense? Cholbi 
gives several reasons why it might not be seen as self-defense. The first is that 
the origin of the threat towards oneself is endogenous, rising from within oneself. 
As he puts it, “self-defense is most naturally understood as defending oneself 
against something that exists independently of the self.”34 However, it can be asked 
whether the borders between endogenous and exogenous are actually justified. 
Even if cancer works within one’s body, it is not under the control of oneself. Cholbi 
makes the correction by regarding exogenous as covering those threats that are 
distinct from us in an ethical sense. This means that the reason for killing oneself 
can be to defend oneself against those otherwise uncontrollable forces that inhibit 
living a life that is consistent with one’s beliefs and aspirations. In such cases, even 
if death is seen as bad, continued living is seen as even worse, and ending one’s 
life could be a more authentic act, even though there are ambiguities with regard 
to destroying the entity that should be authentic.35 Thus, I am willing to see killing 
in self-defense as allowing at least some moral justification in those individual 
cases in which a person’s aspirations and self-image are severely and inevitably 
threatened by continuing to live, and the life continued would therefore, in the light 
of the best diagnostic criteria, be filled with suffering, be it psychological or physical 
in kind. The problem, in my opinion, is more about how to make sure that the threat 
that motivates the person’s self-killing is real and significant enough to make dying 
a better choice than continuing to live. Another problem is whether the choice to 





commit suicide, in a moral sense, is purely a matter concerning the individual, and 
not society or some other external authority.36
The background for the argument of self-knowledge is that each person knows 
his or her own interests best. This argument at least partly responds to the problem 
of assessment of others’ motives and the degree of threat to their authenticity, 
because the authority for making that evaluation is given to the subjects themselves. 
It also makes clear why killing others is not justified in the same way as killing 
oneself, as we can never know people’s motivations and degree of suffering as 
well as they themselves do. For instance, if we refer to the amount of pain as a 
measurement for the moral justification of killing, it is the person experiencing the 
pain who can best assess how painful his or her condition is.37 
Even though it seems that a certain kind of self-knowledge gives good grounds 
for the moral permissibility of suicide, several problems are involved. One issue 
has to do with the quantity and quality of our awareness; how knowledgeable are 
we actually about our present and future interests? Taking into consideration the 
ambiguities suicidal people seem to have about their intentions, how can we be 
sure their present day intentions and preferences would not change dramatically 
in the near future?38 Once dead, there is no coming back to make a better choice, 
so killing oneself seems to require extremely careful consideration in order to 
assess all the possible futures. Also, sometimes others are better able to see the 
whole picture as well as future possibilities, especially if the suicidal individual’s 
psychological condition is affected by depression or another illness, which is often 
the case.39
Cholbi distinguishes two main faults in the argument that one’s body is one’s 
property. Firstly, the use of one’s property (in this case, killing it) can be harmful 
to others, especially to one’s significant others as well as to the community as 
a whole, for instance by the loss of one’s input in work or by being a negative 
model to others. The harm can also be more straightforward if the means of killing 
oneself causes physical injury to others or damages their properties. Secondly, the 
conditions of owning oneself are not as self-evident as with other property rights, 
because our body is not distinct from us as are other properties. One problem 
is the starting point of ownership; our existence temporally coincides with that of 
our bodies, so in comparison to other properties, which we have come to own at 
a certain moment and in a certain way (such as buying a house), it is not clear 
how and when our bodies become our property. Did someone else own our body 
36 The latter issue is about paternalism and suicide; whether others are ever justified in interfering 
with someone’s suicidal behavior or whether they could be morally obliged to assist in another’s 
suicidal act. It is a question about where the authority for moral judgments lies: in subjective selves/
persons or in an objective reality?
37 Cholbi 2011, 81.
38 Fairbairn (1995, 57‒69) considers the problem of changing intentions and suicide in his 
Contemplating Suicide. The Language And Ethics of Self Harm.
39 Cholbi 2011, 82.
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before us? We are also unable to distance ourselves from our bodies, as we can 
do with the rest of our property, nor can we entrust it to others in the same way as 
other properties.40 In addition, in the classical liberalism of John Stuart Mill, people 
should not be allowed, for instance, to sell themselves, because that would inhibit 
their further freedom. The same applies to killing oneself, for, according to Mill, “[i]t 
is not freedom, to be allowed to alienate his freedom.”41 The right-to-die claim is 
thus controversial even within the libertarian tradition.
There is an influential line of thought which states that suicide should be 
permissible if it is rationally chosen.42 Rationality in libertarian moral theories as 
well as with regard to voluntary death is connected to the notion of autonomy, 
and the background for the emphasis on both rationality and autonomy in moral 
choices is largely based on Immanuel Kant’s moral philosophy and enlightenment 
humanism in general.43 
With regard to voluntary death and the argument for its moral permissibility, it 
is necessary to assess what both autonomy and rationality amount to. The most 
basic understanding of autonomy is that autonomous individuals have the ability 
to guide their actions according to their own choices.44 The Merriam Webster 
medical dictionary defines autonomy as “the quality or state of being independent, 
free, and self-directing.”45 There are, to be sure, several further distinctions 
of autonomy, such as the difference between personal autonomy and moral 
autonomy, or variations between ideal and basic autonomy. Also, freedom is to be 
distinguished from autonomy, in that freedom often refers more straightforwardly 
to a condition without external or internal constraints affecting one’s abilities to 
act. If one has negative freedom, it means there are no external factors inhibiting 
one’s actions, whereas positive freedom entails some kind of internal control over 
one’s choices.46 In addition, the ongoing debate on the definition of voluntariness 
is often connected to the notion of autonomy, and is separate from the concept of 
40 Cholbi 2011, 84–87. With regard to entrusting, however, it can be asked whether we can entrust 
our dead bodies to someone (e.g. for medicine) in the same way as other properties.
41 Mill 2011 (1859), 195.
42 Cholbi 2011, 88–89; Battin 1996, 114.
43 Christman 2009. This is not to say that individual autonomy was not at all discussed or present 
in previous Western cultures, but that the emphasis on rationality and autonomy of every individual 
was strongly confirmed during the 18th-century enlightenment, and lived on and still flourishes in 
liberal political ideologies, although the concept of personal autonomy has naturally been modified 
from that of Kant. On Kant’s concept of autonomy, see Formosa 2013.
44 John Christman describes individual autonomy as “an idea that is generally understood to refer 
to the capacity to be one’s own person, to live one’s life according to reasons and motives that are 
taken as one’s own and not the product of manipulative or distorting external forces.” (Christman 
2009.)
45 <www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/autonomy> (visited 6 August 2013)




freedom.47 Voluntariness can refer to individuals’ wanting or consenting to do what 
they are doing or to their ability to choose what their wants are. The former is about 
first- and second-order desires and the latter about third-order desires. As in John 
Locke’s famous example, one can be in a locked room voluntarily, yet not be free 
to leave the room.48 Thus, one can be autonomous ‒ act according to one’s desires 
or intentions ‒ and do things voluntarily without actually being positively free; i.e. 
one is not able to choose one’s desires and volitions. This distinction is important, 
as it allows the continuing use of voluntariness and autonomy in the discourse of 
morality. This is possible even if our understanding of human nature and free will 
becomes wholly deterministic and we lose the concept of a libertarian freedom of 
will, by which I mean the possibility to choose our desires, whether first-, second-, 
or third-order in nature.
To take only the above-mentioned basic autonomy into account would still be 
too hasty, as it is easy to imagine individuals as autonomous in the sense that they 
choose their actions according to their choices. Yet they may not have specifically 
rational choices in the sense that they would be instrumentally rational (maximally 
efficient in achieving one’s goals), theoretically rational (consistent with one’s beliefs, 
for instance), or made by using certain intellectual capacities (such as awareness 
and approval of first-order desires).49 Children, for instance, can often be seen as 
autonomous, but they lack some or all of the central elements of rationality, such 
as sufficient knowledge of their interests, or the capability to guide their behavior 
so as to increase their well-being.50 
In order to understand the conceptions of autonomy and rationality within the 
right-to-die discussion, it is useful, as Margaret Battin has done, to separate the 
rationality conditions for suicide into cognitive and interest conditions.51 Cognitive 
conditions require that an individual’s appraisal of the situation be rational and 
well-informed. In order to make a rational assessment, individuals must have the 
use of certain cognitive functions, such as sensory abilities, the capability to make 
inferences and discuss their perceptions understandably, and a lack of paranoia 
or an otherwise delusional worldview. They also need to have enough knowledge 
of their situation, such as the prognosis of their illness. Interest conditions require 
that suicide in fact is in the interest of the individual. Under such conditions, dying 
helps avoid future difficulties, dying is at least a less harmful option than continued 
living in the person’s situation, and dying is in accord with one‘s most fundamental 
47 For the debate on the conception of voluntariness, see Colburn 2008.
48 Locke 1689, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, book 2, chapter 21, section 10.
49 For the definitions and conditions of rationality, see Gert 1995, 675; Christman 2009, chapter 
1.2.
50 Cholbi 2011, 89. Whether children are seen as autonomous is certainly dependent on what we 
mean by autonomy. Here I refer to the basic understanding of the term mentioned above.
51 Battin 1996, 114–136; Cholbi 2011, 88–97.
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interests and commitments.52 Based on these elements, an assessment of real-life 
cases of suicide and their rationality could involve the following steps: 
1.  Making sure that individuals have enough knowledge of the facts that are 
creating the urge to suicide. This means, for instance, that they can reflect 
on their own psychological state and its persistence conditions, and that they 
know the nature and prognosis of their illness. It also means they have the 
broadest possible knowledge of the alternatives for suicide and the probable 
progression of their state and outcome within these alternatives.
2.  Making sure that individuals understand killing is a permanent solution. This 
condition refers to the facility for causal and inferential reasoning. It also 
requires a realistic worldview that is shared by a sufficient number of other 
people. What is debatable is whether beliefs in an afterlife, for instance, can 
be counted as belonging to a realistic worldview, or whether it is enough to 
state that a certain group of people believe the same.53 In other words, does 
realism refer to a certain kind of metaphysical position, such as scientific 
realism?
3.  Making sure there is enough reflection on one’s values and worldview 
so that individuals are positive that dying accords with their fundamental 
commitments. A very broad and holistic approach is recommended when 
assessing moral principles and epistemological and metaphysical positions. 
This could mean asking questions such as: What is the best way to gain 
knowledge of moral values in general and in your context? How strong is 
your belief in the worldview you possess? Do you think your way of seeing 
the world and morality could change in time? If your significant other was 
in your situation, how would you value his/her choice? It can also include 
making sure that the person understands the effect of suicide on others and 
on society. This means that a person can evaluate the amount of good and 
bad involved in a certain choice from a larger point of view. Even though this 
kind of other-regarding concern does not necessarily give normative value to 
the choice itself, considering the effect on others might be relevant for some 
people and is thus reasonable to deal with as a factual consequence of one’s 
action.
This type of procedure could undoubtedly be used only in strictly organized 
contexts, which in the present societal situation would most often be conducted 
under medical care. As such, it leads us towards the conclusion that euthanasia 
and assisted suicide would be the closest to rational suicide in our circumstances.
52 Battin 1996, 116–136; Cholbi 2011, 90–91.
53 See also Battin 1996, 118–120.
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Challenges for Rational Suicide
In terms of a broader approach to the moral status of suicide, we can ask some 
questions that may cast doubt on previous arguments for the moral permissibility 
of suicide. First, it may be relevant to ponder the issue of autonomy, rationality, and 
coercion within voluntary death in the light of some recent views on human nature. 
Second, we assume that it is meaningful to discuss moral issues. Is it? 
Within a naturalistic worldview, as described previously, responses to the 
changing picture of humanity and its moral and societal consequences have already 
been developed.54 If we take this kind of naturalism seriously and assume some 
version of determinism, understood at its simplest as a belief in causal closure, it 
also means that our environment and the attitudes, values and rules it contains 
play a major role in the way we conduct our lives. This may cause concern to 
the adherents of individual, rational autonomy and the right to voluntary death, 
for if our society approves of the right to kill oneself, there is a possibility that this 
alternative becomes more common just because it is a socially accepted form of 
behavior. This complicates the idea of coercion, because even if suicidal people 
do not have immediate or easily recognizable coercive agents around them, there 
may be aspects in their lives that have a major influence on the decision to commit 
suicide. It is thus yet to be defined whether a naturalistic kind of autonomy includes 
only acts done without external coercive agents and not, for instance, acts done 
because of internal coercive intentions (such as one’s religious beliefs, political 
opinions or emotional states) or external but not agent-directed coercion (such 
as societal status, unemployment or loneliness). It seems also that the difference 
between internal and external influences is often blurred, especially if one thinks 
about the causal yet not agent-induced power of such life-transforming events 
and conditions as abuse in childhood, depression, other illnesses or traumas, 
addictions, accidents or war. 
In essence, the question is whether we are ever rational in the way required by 
the aforementioned conditions. Is there enough room for the rational capacities, 
autonomy, freedom, and voluntariness that are needed for rational suicide? Clinical 
findings on suicidal people imply that people seem to have fantasies of and beliefs 
in a “better afterlife,” so death is not necessarily seen as an end to one’s personal 
existence.55 Also, according to evolutionary psychological theories, we seem 
to have strong intuitions about dualistic personhood and an afterlife, which can 
influence our understanding of death and strengthen these fantasies, even if these 
intuitions are not deterministic or insurmountable as such.56
54 See note 2.
55 See page 5.
56 See, for instance, Bering 2002; 2008; Boyer 2006.
Death and Mortality – From Individual to Communal Perspectives
152
There also seem to be deeper meta-ethical questions involved here, such as 
what makes something good or bad and how different values should be prioritized. 
Should we prefer the rights of an individual (right to die) or give more emphasis to 
the community (effect of suicide on the welfare of others and the community as a 
whole)? And above all, does a naturalistic worldview permit any kind of conclusions 
on moral permissibility or impermissibility? Alex Rosenberg calls for moral nihilism 
as the only justifiable alternative with regard to naturalistic ethics. He states, 
though, that this does not mean that people would not continue to behave “nicely.” 
Humans are wired to have similar core moral beliefs across cultures, motivated 
mostly by our emotions, which direct our behavior. The cultural differences in 
moral norms come basically from varying factual beliefs.57 Talking about rightness 
and wrongness (morality) is also very different from considering the goodness 
or badness of an act (axiology). Goodness or badness can be measured against 
a chosen indicator, such as physical suffering, amount of negative emotions, or 
harm to others, whereas justifying acts as right or wrong requires reference to 
meta-ethical principles. Axiology can be used as a guideline in the applications 
of casuistry if the chosen indicators of value are explicit, in which case judgments 
about the permissibility or impermissibility of an act need not be based on any 
universal moral codes but are case-specific. In this manner, suicide could be seen 
as permissible in a specific individual situation if we have weighed the pros and 
cons with reference to chosen indicators, such as the amount of suffering or harm 
which others experience.
Bearing this in mind, I am inclined to leave the decision on the moral permissibility 
of suicide open, and instead encourage the use of rational conditions as an ideal 
reference point for individual, case-by-case incidences of voluntary death.58
Conclusion
The concept of suicide is ambiguous but it is still important to discuss it, especially 
because of its real-life relevance and the differing moral sentiments attached to 
it. Considering the naturalist predicament and the vagueness of the definition of 
suicide, it seems that the safest way to assess its moral and legal status is to deal 
with different cases of voluntary death separately. A universal commandment such 
as “Thou shalt not kill yourself” is thus not the best moral philosophical solution, at 
least not in the naturalistic context. This means that euthanasia, assisted suicide, 
self-accomplished suicide, and suicidal behavior, for instance, should not be 
seen as having the same moral (and legislative) status, even if they are all on the 
continuum of suicidal phenomena. Whereas suicidal behavior can in many cases 
57 Rosenberg 2011, 94–145. For evolutionary biology and morality, see FitzPatrick 2008.




be judged as irrational and harmful to both the individual and society, euthanasia 
on the contrary could often be seen as both rational and following the interests 
of an individual. Whether all the rational conditions are ever fulfilled in real-life 
cases is yet another question, as is the actual state of suicide in our legislation and 
the justification for it. In our democracy these are choices for the electorate, not 
philosophers.
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